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District Level Explanations for Supporter Involvement in 
Political Parties: The Importance of Electoral Factors1 
 
Justin Fisher (Brunel University London), David Cutts (University of Bath), Edward Fieldhouse 
(University of Manchester) & Bettina Rottweiler (Brunel University London) 
 
 
Introduction 
In recent years, clear evidence has emerged from several countries that 
traditional notions of party membership have come under challenge, with non-
members or supporters playing key roles in party activities conventionally 
associated with formal party members (Cross & Gauja, 2014a, 2014b; Fisher, 
Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2014; Gauja, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c; Gauja & Jackson, 
2016; Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Kosiara-Pedersen, Bille & Nielsen, 2012; Mjelde, 
2015; Rahat, Kenig & Tuttnauer, 2014; Sandri & Seddone, 2015; Scarrow,  
2015, Webb, Poletti & Bale, 2016). Parties are finding it increasingly difficult to 
maintain membership organisations, and in response to declining membership 
rates, are experimenting with new organisational styles to develop links with 
supporters – non-members (Scarrow, 2015). This has manifested itself in a 
variety of ways; involvement in election campaigning, candidate and leader 
selection (including primaries), online policy deliberations and even policy 
formation, leading one author to propose a framework to catalogue these 
developments, which rests on distinct boundaries in respect of what activities 
supporters may or may not participate (Mjelde, 2015). This goes well beyond 
Duverger’s (1954) concentric circles of increasing affiliation and participation, 
such that the boundaries between supporters and members are increasingly 
indistinct. The causes of this are various. Rahat, Kenig & Tuttnauer (2014: 4) 
argue in the Israeli case, for example, that dealignment between voters and 
parties is accelerating the opening of opportunities for supporters, while 
Sandri & Seddone (2015: 25) also point to declining party membership and 
the declining importance of cleavage politics. Indeed, Gauja (2015b: 90) 
suggests that this may reflect a shift in political parties, defining and 
organising themselves ‘in terms of individual citizens rather than group 
interests’.  
                                                 
1
  This research was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (Grant No. ES/M007251/1).  
 
To be published in Party Politics 
Page | 2  
 
 
Scarrow (2015), however, argues that it is a deliberate strategy. Parties are 
blurring the lines or boundaries between members and supporters; partly in 
response to voter disaffection, with primaries in particular being used to 
indicate a ‘break from the past’ (Sandri & Seddone, 2015: 29); but also as a 
function of the availability and use of new technologies, which makes it easier 
to link supporters with parties. Gauja (2015b), for example, identifies 
examples in Australia and Britain, whereby parties have utilized online 
technology to facilitate policy discussions beyond the parties’ traditional 
memberships. Certainly, the web in particular is a means by which supporter 
activity can be facilitated, whether through volunteering, donating money or 
ultimately joining the party (Scarrow, 2015: 148). Along similar lines, Mjelde 
(2015: 300) suggests that this openness to supporters may be a function of 
societal and technological changes transforming the nature of campaigning 
from labour to capital intensive, thereby reducing parties’ need for formal 
members. There is an appealing logic to this argument, but it is at odds with 
findings in Britain, at least, which demonstrate that labour intensive grassroots 
campaigning delivers stronger electoral payoffs than those that incur cost 
(Fisher, 2011; Fisher, Johnston, Cutts, Pattie & Fieldhouse, 2014). 
 
Notwithstanding, organisational changes in the British Labour Party are an 
excellent example of such broader developments, with supporters being 
required simply to pay a fee of £3 to take part in the election of the party’s 
leader in 2015; a development analogous to the selection of the leader of the 
Partito Democratico in Italy (Kenig, 2009), and the selection of French 
Socialist Party’s presidential candidate in 2011, where supporters of the Parti 
Socialiste and the Parti Radical de Gauche were required to pay €1 in order to 
participate (Fisher, Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2014: 77). Such processes can create 
what Scarrow (2015) describes as fluid affiliation categories within multi-
speed membership parties. She argues that parties can pursue three main 
strategies to boost participation: increase the rewards associated with 
traditional membership; reduce the costs of joining a party; and change or 
redefine what membership or enrolment means. Parties that adopt all three 
would be pursuing a multi-speed approach to membership, which both 
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bolsters traditional membership, but also creates opportunities for supporter 
involvement (Scarrow, 2015: 128). The key difference with such new affiliation 
categories compared with traditional membership is that they are low cost, do 
not require long-term commitments and offer immediate opportunities for 
participation and communication. In return, parties gain invaluable contact 
information, which can be used to help nurture engagement, and possibly 
future membership (Scarrow, 2015: 135-6). Supporters also deliver further 
advantages for parties by being less ‘sensitive to the traditional party 
discourse’ than members, thereby allowing parties more flexibility (Sandri and 
Seddone, 2015: 26). 
 
Election campaigning is a particularly important area in terms of supporter 
activity. Rahat, Henig & Tuttnauer (2014: 30) find, for example, that in the 
Israeli case, parties make recruiting supporters before elections a top priority, 
while Fisher, Fieldhouse & Cutts (2014) demonstrate in the British case that 
supporter involvement in election campaigns is extensive. Analysing district-
level campaigns in the 2010 general election, they show that a significant 
proportion of campaigns (around three quarters) at the district or constituency 
level involved supporters (Fisher, Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2014).  Not only that, 
the participation of supporters was nontrivial. On average, supporters 
engaged in around two thirds of the activities undertaken by members. The 
principal variation revolved around high and low intensity participation – 
supporters were much less likely to engage in pre-election voter contact: 
doorstep and telephone canvassing. Indeed, in some activities such as leaflet 
delivery, the evidence reflected the experience in Australia where the 
distinction between members and supporters, in respect of core campaigning 
activities, is ‘essentially meaningless’ (Cross & Gauja, 2014b:12). Yet 
supporters were not simply additional workers, duplicating the activities of 
members. While supporter activities did complement those of members, they 
also supplemented them. In sum, Fisher, Fieldhouse & Cutts (2010) showed 
that supporters made independent and positive contributions to all three main 
parties’ campaigns. 
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Supporters, then clearly matter to many political parties in a variety of 
democracies. However, far less work has been done in respect of explaining 
supporter recruitment and the level of activities in which they engage. In other 
words, the extant literature says relative little about variation between parties 
in terms of levels of supporter recruitment or supporter activities within parties. 
These questions matter because just as with more conventional party 
members, there are sometimes very significant variations between parties, 
which require explanation. Not only that, it is important to understand why, as 
with party members, there may be variation in respect of low or high intensity 
activities. In this paper, therefore, we seek to address two important 
questions:  
 
• What explains supporter recruitment? 
• What explains levels of supporter activity? 
 
Explaining Supporter Recruitment and Activity 
The existing literature suggests two broad explanations for variation in 
supporter recruitment: the structure of a party – its position in the party system 
and to an extent, its traditional ideological profile – and the electoral fortunes 
of a party, with electoral popularity being a catalyst for recruitment. The 
emphasis in much of the existing literature is on the former. Gauja & 
Jackson’s (2016) study of the Australian Greens, for example, suggests that a 
party such as this, which is part of a broader social movement, may be more 
likely to recruit supporters than ‘mainstream’ political parties. The same may 
be true of the Liberal Democrats in Britain, remembering that prior to entering 
the coalition government in 2010, the party shared some of the characteristics 
of the Australian Greens in as much as they were somewhat outside the 
mainstream and often the recipient of votes from electors who had previously 
supported the main two parties. Thus, Fisher, Fieldhouse & Cutts suggest that 
the Liberal Democrats’ success in recruiting supporters in the 2010 British 
general election campaign may have reflected the party’s traditional and 
ideological commitment to community politics and the similar ideological 
structuring of Liberal Democrat members and supporters (Fisher, Fieldhouse 
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& Cutts, 2014: 81; Whiteley et al, 2006: 65). A variant of this thesis is also 
outlined by Mjelde (2015: 306). He suggests that older parties may be less 
willing to accommodate supporters, especially where the party is more 
hierarchically structured. His analysis here is based on radical right parties, 
but the point about hierarchy may well be relevant, when comparing more and 
less established parties.  
 
An alternative hypothesis to the structural model, however, is also put forward 
by Fisher, Fieldhouse & Cutts (2014). Born of a lack of previous data by which 
they could assess the extent to which their findings in 2010 were typical, they 
suggest that parties might find it more difficult to recruit supporters where a 
party had little chance of electoral success or where the election outcome was 
very predictable (Fisher, Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2014: 92). From this 
perspective, supporters would be more likely to be active in tighter elections, 
and where a party’s possible chances of success are fairly strong. Such 
reasoning is informed theoretically by rational choice, such that pivotality (or 
at least a perception of pivotality) is a key driver for participation. Empirically, 
too, there is evidence that member retention is influenced strongly by electoral 
fortunes (Fisher, 2000; Fisher, Denver & Hands, 2006). Variations in 
supporter recruitment from this perspective are a function of electoral fortunes 
and supporters’ responses to them rather than the structural or ideological 
positioning of a party. We summarize these two perspectives in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Explanations of supporter recruitment 
 
Structure Recent Electoral Fortunes 
 Mainstream 
(Hierarchical) 
Party 
Outsider Party/ 
Wider 
Movement 
Positive 
Electoral 
Fortunes 
Negative 
Electoral 
Fortunes 
Higher Recruitment  X X  
Lower Recruitment X   X 
 
If structure is a persuasive argument, we should observe differentiation in 
recruitment between ‘mainstream’ and ‘outsider’ parties. ‘Outsider’ parties 
should recruit supporters more extensively as they are more likely to be part 
of a broader social movement and/or they are less hierarchical, and these 
variations should hold over time. However, if electoral fortunes are a better 
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explanation of variation, we should observe change over time depending on 
an individual party’s electoral performance. Thus: 
H1. Supporter recruitment will be more extensive in outsider parties 
than in mainstream ones. 
 
H2. Supporter recruitment is a function of electoral popularity, where 
reduced popularity leads to a decline in supporter recruitment and vice 
versa. 
 
An associated aspect of this question is the efforts made by parties 
themselves, which relates to how supporters are recruited. The existing 
literature suggests that the availability and promotion of online engagement is 
a strong cue (Gauja, 2015b; Mjelde, 2015; Scarrow, 2015). Scarrow’s analysis 
(2015: 148-51) is particularly detailed and ranks both countries and party 
families (capturing the ideological profile of a party) in respect of their online 
accessibility for members, supporters and donors. In respect of volunteers, 
Australia, Canada and the UK are comfortably the most advanced in terms of 
volunteer accessibility, while in terms of party families there is little difference 
in respect of volunteer accessibility (though centre-right and ‘others’ score 
marginally higher). The reliability of those scores is, however amplified when 
accessibility overall is assessed, with Social Democrats, Liberals and Greens 
scoring noticeably higher. Supporter recruitment can therefore be 
characterised as varying both in terms of structural factors (the type of party in 
terms of ideological profile), but also, in part, as a function of parties’ own 
efforts from a top-down perspective, with parties that create more online 
opportunities being more successful in recruiting supporters.  
 
However, while the findings in the extant studies are helpful, they suffer from 
a lack of comparison with other modes of recruitment. In other words, the 
assumption is that if online facilities for recruitment exist, they must be 
influential. But mobilization can take a number of forms alongside online. An 
alternative hypothesis is therefore required. Fisher, Fieldhouse, Cutts, 
Johnston & Pattie, (2016) show, for example,  that in terms of electoral 
turnout, voters respond much better to personal contact than parties’ online 
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mobilization efforts. The same logic may also apply, therefore, in terms of the 
means by which supporters are recruited – namely that personal contact will 
be more effective. We therefore posit three hypotheses:  
 
H3. Supporters are more likely to be recruited online rather than offline 
H4. Modes of recruitment will vary depending on whether a party is a 
mainstream one or an outsider  
H5. Centre-Left parties will be more successful in recruiting online, due 
to higher levels of accessibility  
 
Our focus now becomes explanations of the level of election activity 
undertaken by supporters. Previous work on party supporters has shown that 
the efforts made in campaigns are nontrivial and make an independent and 
positive impact upon the strength of campaigns (Fisher, Fieldhouse & Cutts, 
2014). However, there is variation in terms of the range of activities 
undertaken by supporters and indeed in comparison with party members, 
supporters in both the British and Italian cases are generally more likely to 
engage in leaflet delivery, taking numbers at polling stations and helping out 
in the campaign office – low intensity activity; and less likely to involve 
themselves in contacting electors prior to the election – high intensity activity 
(Fisher, Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2014, Sandri & Seddone, 2015: 40; Seyd & 
Whiteley, 1992, 2002; Whiteley, Seyd & Richardson, 1994, 1996; Webb, 
Poletti & Bale, 2016).  
 
Broadly speaking, we can identify three explanations in the literature to 
explain variation. Once again, there are those rooted in party structure and 
electoral fortunes. From these perspectives, we would expect variation to 
occur between mainstream and outsider parties, or as a function of a party’s 
electoral standing – once again, better electoral standing should be an 
incentive for great levels of supporter activity. Our hypotheses are therefore 
as follows: 
 
H6. The type of supporter activity undertaken is a function of party 
structure 
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H7. The type of supporter activity undertaken is a function of electoral 
popularity 
 
However, there is also a third possible explanation in respect of existing party 
strength. Here, we would expect variation in supporter activity in the first 
instance to be a function of the existing strength of local parties, with greater 
strength promoting supporter activity. Previous research suggests varying 
results for the impact of existing party strength. Fisher, Fieldhouse & Cutts 
(2014) showed that in 2010 levels of supporter activity were in part functions 
of existing local party strength, but that there was significant variation by 
party. The relationship between existing party strength and levels of supporter 
activity was much stronger in the case of the Liberal Democrats and much 
weaker for both the Conservatives and Labour. This would suggest some 
traction for the broad party structure thesis, since in 2010, the Liberal 
Democrats could be classed as more of an outsider party.  
 
To test this thesis further, we seek to assess whether or not existing party 
strength is a factor in the number of activities undertaken by party supporters 
and also test for electoral fortunes thesis by analysing the impact of the 
previous election results on levels of subsequent supporter activity. Thus: 
 
H8. The level of supporter activity will be greater where there is existing 
party strength 
H9. The level of supporter activity for individual parties will be larger in 
districts where electoral competition is greater for that party 
 
Data and Measurement 
In order to test these rival hypotheses, we use both new data collected at the 
British general election of 2015 together with similar data collected at the 
2010 election  - see Fisher, Fieldhouse & Cutts (2014). The data are derived 
from surveys of the election agents of Conservative, Labour, Liberal 
Democrat, SNP, Plaid Cymru and UKIP candidates who stood for election in 
districts (constituencies) in Great Britain (632 maximum). Election agents are 
responsible for the organisation and conduct of a candidate’s campaign and 
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are therefore extremely well placed to comment on the recruitment of 
supporters and their involvement in campaigns. Questionnaires were set to all 
agents of the candidates from parties under examination immediately after 
polling day2. Responses to the 2015 study comprise of 244 Conservative, 336 
Labour, 332 Liberal Democrat, & 204 United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP) agents in Great Britain, and 31 Scottish National Party (SNP) 
(maximum 59) and 21 Plaid Cymru (PC) (maximum 40) in Scotland and 
Wales respectively.3 All of these parties either had a had a long history of 
participating in national elections and winning seats on a regular basis, or in 
the case of UKIP had the potential to do so, with the party fielding candidates 
in almost all seats in Great Britain and having enjoyed significant success in 
both opinion polls and the European elections in the preceding years.4   
 
The survey contained a number questions related to supporter involvement in 
the parties’ campaigns, including whether or not supporters were recruited, 
the number recruited, the means by which they were recruited and the 
campaign activities in which they took part (with identical questions for party 
members for comparison). Five campaign activities were identified through 
binary (YES/NO) response categories – delivering leaflets; taking numbers at 
polling stations; helping at the campaign office, telephoning electors, and 
doorstep canvassing. Identical questions (with the exceptions of those on 
recruitment methods) were included in a comparable election study at the 
2010 election.  
 
These data allow us therefore to assess whether there are variations in 
supporter recruitment across six separate parties and test which explanation 
(structure or electoral fortunes) is more persuasive, since we can compare 
results over two elections (2010 and 2015) rather than at just one time point. 
                                                 
2
  In 2015, no questionnaires were sent to agents in Buckingham (the Speaker’s seat), or to Rochdale and 
Heywood & Middleton. In the case of the latter two constituencies, the local authority (Rochdale) did not 
publish details of the agents. No electoral agent address details were available for 18 UKIP agents. This 
was principally the case where the agents were also Parliamentary candidates. The  responses were 
representative of the total population of agents for the three GB parties, based on the electoral status of 
their seats (see Appendix). 
3
  Figures from the 2010 study are taken from Fisher, Fieldhouse and Cutts (2014) 
4
  Up to a point, the same was true in respect of the Greens, who won a seat in 2010 and stood in 573 seats 
compared with 335 in 2010. However, unlike UKIP, the party did not experience the same level of 
momentum in terms of opinion poll ratings or election successes. 
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In this respect, Britain is an excellent case by which to examine the structure 
versus electoral fortunes perspectives. First, there is the existence of both 
mainstream and outsider parties, who regular engage in electoral activity in a 
relatively stable party system. Thus, although our testing applies to parties in 
only one country, the method and party structure in Britain lends itself to 
replication in other countries. To test the structure hypothesis, therefore, we 
compare supporter recruitment by the main GB parties (the ‘mainstream’ 
parties) with the national parties (Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru) 
and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) - the ‘outsider’ parties.  
 
Secondly, in the two elections under consideration (2010 and 2015), there 
was considerable variation on electoral fortunes for some parties under 
examination; while for others there was little change. This makes the British 
elections of 2010 and 2015 ideal to test the electoral fortunes thesis. In both 
elections, the circumstances for recruiting active supporters for the 
Conservatives and Labour were arguably strong. The opinion polls suggested 
that both elections would be tight, with the possibility that either party could 
form a government (albeit most likely in a coalition or as a minority 
government) (Cowley & Kavanagh, 2016: 232). In the case of the Liberal 
Democrats, however, the picture in 2015 was very different from the one in 
2010. From soon after entering a governing coalition with the Conservatives 
following the 2010 election, the party’s popularity plummeted, and repeated 
poor performances in local authority and European elections after 2010 
further highlighted the party’s electoral plight (Cutts & Russell, 2015). Under 
these circumstances, we would expect Liberal Democrat supporter 
recruitment to be lower in 2015 compared with 2010, since the incentives for 
participation would be less attractive for individuals who had not committed 
themselves to formal party membership. Equally, in Scotland, the SNP’s 
prospects were radically different in 2015 compared with 2010. Following the 
referendum of Scottish independence in 2014, the SNP’s polling figures 
surged despite the referendum rejecting independence (Mitchell, 2015). In 
Wales, by way of contrast, Plaid Cymru’s electoral prospects in 2010 and 
2015 were very similar (Bradbury, 2015). Thus, we would expect a growth in 
SNP supporter recruitment, with that of Plaid being unchanged. For all parties 
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except UKIP, we have data for both elections, which allows us to confirm 
whether the results hold over two data points. 
 
Results 
We assess H1 and H2 (the recruitment of supporters) in Table 1, which 
illustrates the proportion of district (or constituency) campaigns recruiting 
supporters in 2010 and 2015 and the mean numbers of supporters recruited 
where this occurred.5 We assess the structure hypothesis first, where we 
expect supporter recruitment to be greater in ‘outsider’ parties (H1). The 
evidence is not supportive. In both 2010 and 2015, the ‘outsider’ parties were 
less likely to recruit supporters than the ‘mainstream’ ones. This also applies 
in respect of the numbers of supporters recruited on average. In only one 
instance do ‘outsider’ parties outperform the ‘mainstream’ ones – the mean 
number of SNP supporters recruited compared with Labour in 2015. If we 
classify the Liberal Democrats as ‘outsiders’ in 2010, there is a little more 
support, but as is clear in 2015, that success was not repeated. 
 
The electoral fortunes thesis fares better (H2). The proportion of districts 
recruiting supporters for Labour is virtually identical (as is the mean number of 
supporters recruited), while for the Conservatives, there is a small decline – 
65% of districts compared with 75% in 2010, though the mean number 
recruited is unchanged. For the Liberal Democrats, however, the impact of the 
party’s unpopularity following the 2010 election is stark. In 2010, some 86% of 
district-level campaigns recruited supporters. In 2015, however, that 
proportion sank to 45% - a drop of nearly 50%. However, somewhat 
surprisingly, the average number recruited rose from 19 to 24. This suggests 
that supporter recruitment may have been better targeted compared with 
2010 and indeed, the largest numbers of party supporters were recruited in 
the party’s nominally safest seats, which given that party’s perilous electoral 
position was where the party focussed most attention (Fisher, Fieldhouse, 
Cutts & Rottweiler, 2015). In respect of the other parties, the evidence for the 
                                                 
5
  In a small number of cases (5), the reported number of supporters declared was considered to be 
unreliable, being far in excess of other responses and adversely distorting the mean. As a result, those 
were removed from calculation of the mean. For 2015, this represented 3 Labour cases, 1 Liberal 
Democrat and 1 UKIP case.  As a result, the mean number of supporters may be a slight underestimate. 
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electoral fortunes thesis is a little more mixed. On the one hand, while the 
SNP recruited supporters in fewer districts in 2015, despite the party’s 
popularity, the mean number recruited rose threefold. Equally, however, while 
Plaid Cymru recruited an identical number of supporters on average, the 
proportion of districts in which they were recruited increased.  
 
On balance, therefore, there is more support for the electoral fortunes 
hypothesis than the structural one. Electoral fortunes were influential as 
predicted for Labour, the Liberal Democrats and to an extent the SNP. The 
slight fall in Conservative recruitment is possibly more difficult to explain. On 
electoral prospects alone, we would expect supporter recruitment to be 
maintained. In one sense it is – nearly two thirds of Conservative campaigns 
recruited supporters. But of course, compared with 2010, the level fell by ten 
percentage points. Clearly an additional explanation is required. One 
possibility is the ‘cost of governing’ – popularity may wane among supporters 
the longer a party is in power, particularly if it has to make unpopular 
decisions. A better explanation, however is one rooted in Fisher, Denver & 
Hands’ hierarchy of election outcomes (2006). In respect of the retention of 
party members, they argue that election performance matters and that some 
outcomes are better than others. Thus, winning is always better than losing, 
but that a new victory is in turn better than repeating a victory. In this case, the 
possibility of ending Labour rule in 2010 would have been a better recruiting 
sergeant for supporters than the prospect of simply maintaining Conservative 
rule, with a strong possibility that that would be in coalition, particularly given 
that no public polls suggested a Conservative majority was a likely outcome 
and only 11% of voters thought such an outcome likely.6 Overall then, it would 
appear that electoral fortunes and supporters’ reaction to them may explain 
supporter recruitment better than analyses based on parties’ structural 
position. 
 
  
                                                 
6
  Voter election outcome expectations are derived from an Ipsos-MORI poll in April 2015. https://www.ipsos-
mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/2565/Expected-general-election-outcome-19792005.aspx. 
Accessed 11/8/15 
To be published in Party Politics 
Page | 13  
 
Table 1. Supporter Recruitment by Party 
 % Recruiting 
party 
supporters 
 
(2010 in 
parenthesis) 
Mean no’s 
recruited 
 
(2010 in 
parenthesis) 
Conservative  65 (75)  22 (22) 
Labour  74 (75)  15 (13) 
Liberal Democrat  45 (86)  24 (19) 
SNP 58 (67) 18   (6) 
Plaid Cymru 43 (29) 12 (12) 
UKIP 51  (--) 6   (--) 
 
Note: n for percentage recruiting party supporters: Conservative = 157; Labour = 246 Liberal Democrat = 147; 
SNP = 18; PC = 9; UKIP = 101 
n for Mean numbers of supporters recruited: Conservative = 152; Labour = 237; Liberal Democrat = 144; 
SNP = 18; PC = 9; UKIP = 98 
 
H3, H4 and H5 (the modes of supporter recruitment) are examined in Table 2. 
Our data enable us to test the rival hypotheses as party agents were asked to 
identify the principal means were by which supporters were recruited in their 
district.7 What is very clear for all parties is that while online interaction does 
contribute to supporter recruitment, it has only a marginal impact – far less 
important than is implied in the extant literature. Overall, only 9% of agents 
reported recruiting supporters in this way. For all parties, two other means of 
recruitment are more significant: offline interaction (which includes responses 
to telephone calls and leaflets) and most obviously, human contact (either on 
the doorstep, in the street, through word of mouth or through friendship or 
familial links). These findings challenge the theses that focus solely on the 
role of technology. For sure, the availability on online facilities helps. But just 
as with campaigning, it is the human touch that delivers by far the most 
benefits (Fisher, Johnston, Cutts, Pattie & Fieldhouse, 2014; Fisher, 
Fieldhouse, Cutts, Johnston & Pattie, 2016). In short, online matters; but 
human contact matters a great deal more. The first hypothesis (H3) is not 
therefore supported. 
 
In respect of the second hypothesis (H4), there is some support for the 
structure argument. For ‘mainstream’ parties, human contact and offline 
                                                 
7
  In these tests we combine the two national parties (SNP and Plaid Cymru) as there were fewer responses 
from these parties to the relevant question. 
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interaction matters more than for ‘outsider’ parties. ‘Outsider’ parties, 
however, are more likely to attract self-starters (people who approach the 
party themselves, often through a party office), and national parties in 
particular are more likely to more likely to attract prior activists (those who had 
previously helped the party or a related single-issue campaign). 
 
The ideological profile thesis (H5) is not supported, however – there is no 
variation between centre-left and centre-right parties. However, electoral 
fortunes may play a part. Responses for the national parties are heavily 
skewed towards the SNP. Thus 47% of SNP supporters were self-starters. In 
the context on the 2015 election, this mode of recruitment is therefore also 
partially explained by the party’s electoral fortunes.  
 
Table 2. Means of Supporter Recruitment by Party 2015 
% Con Lab Lib Dem Nat. 
(SNP/PC) 
UKIP All 
Human Contact 45 39 37 24 31 38 
Online Interaction 8 11 6 5 9 9 
Offline Interaction 17 19 21 10 13 18 
Prior Activists 6 8 9 14 0 7 
Self-Starters 9 12 6 38 21 12 
Other 15 13 21 10 26 17 
n 121 199 115 21 80 536 
 
In terms of recruitment then, the extant literature which emphasises party 
structure and online accessibility as key drivers for supporter recruitment does 
not find great support when tested against alternative hypotheses. For sure, 
there are isolated examples which support the structure thesis, such as the 
number of SNP supporters recruited and the greater propensity for outsider 
parties to recruit ‘self-starters’. Equally, online recruitment does matter for all 
parties. But, in general, rival hypotheses perform better. The likelihood of 
supporter recruitment is better explained by parties’ electoral fortunes, and 
human contact matters a great deal more than online in terms of bringing 
supporters on board. Potential supporters are much more likely to respond to 
the electoral prospects of a party and the greater accessibility of human 
contact.  
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The nature of election activities in which party supporters engage is shown in 
Table 3 and allows us to test H6 and H7. Here, we see some support for the 
party structure thesis (H6). Supporters of UKIP and Plaid Cymru were 
generally less active than supporters assisting the mainstream parties across 
a range of categories with the exception of UKIP activity in campaign offices. 
However, the counter evidence here lies with the SNP, where supporter 
activity resembles that of the mainstream parties to much greater degree. 
SNP supporters were at least as likely as Conservative and Labour 
supporters to engage in doorstep canvassing (in fact, slightly more likely). 
These patterns for the SNP in 2015 add further weight to the electoral 
fortunes thesis (H7). Across all but one activity (telephoning electors) SNP 
supporters engaged in significantly more activity compared with 2010 – 
especially in respect of doorstep canvassing. And in that activity, we see 
further support for the electoral fortunes thesis – Liberal Democrat campaigns 
were less likely to have supporters involved in 2015 compared with 2010. 
However, in other respects, there is less support for this thesis, with Liberal 
Democrat supporters more likely to deliver leaflets, although in other activities 
there was barely any change from 2010. Overall, therefore, our hypotheses 
produce mixed results. The structure thesis (H6) finds support for some 
outsider parties but not others, while the electoral fortunes thesis (H7) finds 
strong support for the positive impact of improved electoral prospects, but 
only support for the negative aspects in respect of the most high intensity area 
of activity – doorstep canvassing.  
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Table 3. Activities of Supporters  
% saying YES 
(2010 in 
Parenthesis) 
Cons 
(n=153) 
 
Lab 
(n=242) 
Lib  
Dems 
(n=140) 
SNP 
(n=19) 
PC 
(n=11) 
UKIP 
(n=103) 
Delivering Leaflets 100 (92) 97 (89) 98 (94) 100 (82) 91 (42) 90 
Polling Station 
Number Takers 
54 (65) 34 (33) 47 (47) 32 (20) 9 (18) 17 
Helping at 
Campaign Office 
43 (54) 51 (56) 39 (40) 72 (43) 18 (9) 100 
Telephoning 
Electors 
 
20 (24) 25 (27) 16 (16) 21 (20) 9 (0) 4 
Doorstep 
Canvassing 
51 (42) 45 (38) 14 (22) 53 (19) 27 (33) 10 
 
 
We now look to test H8 and H9 by assessing the extent to which existing 
party strength explains the levels of activity undertaken by supporters and 
comparing these effects with those of the electoral status of a district or 
constituency in respect of that party. We also assess whether these patterns 
hold when we examine only high intensity activity.  
 
To capture levels of supporter activity (the dependent variable), we create a 
single additive scale of the five election participation items shown in Table 3.8 
The impact of existing party strength and electoral fortunes on levels of 
supporter activity is tested using a zero-truncated poisson model. We select 
this technique because it is used to model count data for which the value of 
zero cannot occur (since supporters will have engaged in at least one 
activity). The additive scale ranges from one to five activities so it is not 
possible score a zero.9 We confine our analyses to the three major parties in 
                                                 
8
  In order to maximize the number of cases in the model featured in Table 4, multiple imputation was used 
for the two independent variables, based upon the electoral status (level of party competition) of the seat 
for the individual party. 
9
  As a comparison, we also ran an OLS regression model using the same additive scale as the dependent 
variable. The results from the OLS are largely similar to the Zero truncated Poisson models reported in the 
text with the key predictors significant in both. Only Labour safe seat is significant in Table 4 and not 
significant in at the 95% level in the OLS model, although it is significant at the 90% level. The full OLS 
results are shown in the appendix.  
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this case, as the relatively small numbers of cases for the national parties 
makes extensive analysis impossible. 
 
Our independent variables capturing party strength are the size of the local 
district membership and the proportion of the district covered by an active 
local party. In order to test the electoral fortunes hypothesis, we add further 
independent variables capturing the marginality of the seat for the individual 
party following the results of the 2010 General Election. There are four 
categories of seat: ultra marginal, where the winning margin after the 2010 
general election was less than 5%; marginal, where the winning margin was 
between 5% and 10%; safe, where the relevant party held the seat with a 
winning margin of more than 10%; and not held (or ‘hopeless’), where the 
relevant party did not win a seat and was more than 10% behind the winning 
party. We create binary variables for the first three categories thus making 
‘not held’ the reference category. We hypothesise that supporters will be more 
active in seats where the contest is closer (ultra-marginal or marginal seats) 
or in seats where there is a good chance of victory (safe seats).  
 
In terms of party strength (H8), the findings in Table 4 suggest that a larger 
number of party members is positively associated with more supporter activity 
for the Liberal Democrats and Labour, while neither of the two measures of 
party strength have a statistically significant effect for the Conservatives. The 
results in Table 4 also indicate support for the electoral fortunes thesis (H9). It 
is clear that the electoral status of a seat drives supporter activity with the 
strongest positive effects found in the ultra-marginal seats. Even so, all three 
categories (ultra marginal, marginal and safe) prompt more supporter activity 
overall for the Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats than in their not 
held (or hopeless) seats.  
 
To ease interpretation we can transform these coefficients into incidence rate 
ratios.10 For instance, being a Conservative ultra marginal, holding the other 
                                                 
10
  The term incident rate ratios are used here because of the regression method employed. A rate is the 
number of events per time (or space), which is how our dependent variable is derived. The Poisson 
regression coefficients can be interpreted as the log of the rate ratio, while the rate at which events occur is 
called the incidence rate. Given that the difference of two logs is equal to the log of their quotient it is also 
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variables constant in the model, increases the level of supporter activity by a 
factor of 2.40 than that of not held seats, or equivalently, it increases the 
expected number by 140% when compared against the reference category 
(not held).11 Similar incidence rate ratios are recorded for Labour and Liberal 
Democrat ultra marginals. For Labour, the level of supporter activity increases 
by a factor of 1.50 (+50%), while for the Liberal Democrats it rises by a factor 
of 2.11 (+111%) when compared against not held seats.  
 
We can also calculate the predicted amount of supporter activity in 
Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat ultra marginals where the other 
marginality types are held at zero and the other two variables (number of 
party members and percentage actively covered by the local organisation) are 
held at their means. The predicted amount of supporter activity is highest in 
Conservative closest contests at 3.51, compared with 2.92 and 2.48 for 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats in their most marginal seats. The overall 
patterns then, are clear – electoral circumstances have a far more consistent 
effect on the level of supporter activity than existing party strength. 
 
Table 4. Existing Membership Strength, Previous Electoral Performance and Supporter 
Activity – Zero Truncated Poisson 
 
Dependent Variable = 
Level of Supporter Activity 
 
Conservative 
(n=153) 
 
Labour 
(n=242) 
 
Lib Dems 
(n=140) 
 
 b   S.E. Sig b S.E. Sig b S.E.    Sig 
Constant 
 
0.386  (.122) ** 0.609 (.069) ** 0.149 (.096)    n.s. 
No. of Party Members 
 
0.116  (.071) n.s. 0.078 (.037) **  0.114 (.052)     ** 
% Covered by Active Local  
 
-0.016  (.052) n.s. 0.081 (.047) n.s. -0.001  (.080)    n.s. 
Ultra-Marginal Seat 0.877  (.159) ** 0.460 (.111) ** 0.747 (.227)     ** 
          
Marginal Seat 
 
0.740 (.161) ** 0.408 (.111) ** 0.710 (.209)     ** 
Safe Seat 0.599 (.151) ** 0.245 (.112) ** 0.727 (.217)     ** 
Log Likelihood -228.898  -358.924  -179.057 
 
Note 1: ** p<.01 * p<.05  n.s not statistically significant; 2. Number of Party Members and % Covered by Active Local 
Organisation are standardised.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
applicable to interpret the parameter estimate as the log of the ratio of expected counts (the "ratio" in 
incidence rate ratios). So as an example, Conservative ultra-marginal has a coefficient of +0.887. The 
exponential of this is 2.40. So for Conservative ultra-marginals compared to non-held seats, while holding 
the other variable constant in the model, are expected to have an incidence rate of 2.40 times that of non-
held seats.  
11
  This is calculated as follows: 100*(2.40-1)% = +140%.  
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We extend these analyses by focussing solely on high intensity activity 
(defined as participation in voter contact either on the doorstep or by 
telephone). Here we use a dichotomous or binary dependent variable where 
supporter involvement in high intensity activity is coded as 1 and non-
involvement as 0. The independent variables are identical to those in Table 4 
and the binary nature of the dependent variable means that logistic regression 
is used. The results are shown in Table 5. They show that for all three parties, 
it is electoral circumstances that drive levels of supporter activity. Measures of 
party strength for all parties fail to reach statistical significance. By way of 
contrast, all categories of seat boost activity for Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats, while the same is true for marginal seats for the Conservatives.  
 
To ease interpretation, we estimate the discrete change on the probability for 
each of the values averaged across the observed values. These average 
marginal effects (AMEs) are graphically illustrated in Figures 2-4. For the 
Conservatives, on average, the probability of supporter involvement in high 
intensity activities is 36 percentage points higher in marginal seats than in 
Conservative not held (or ‘hopeless’) seats. Similarly, Labour supporter 
involvement in higher intensity activities is on average 30 percentage points in 
ultra marginals and 22 and 23 percentage points in marginal and safe seats 
higher than in not held (hopeless) Labour seats. And, like Labour the 
probability of Liberal Democrat supporter involvement in high intensity 
activities is higher, on average, in ultra marginal seats (33 percentage points) 
than marginal (27 percentage points) and safe (28 percentage points) when 
compared with not held (hopeless) Liberal Democrat seats.   
 
In sum, we find some support for H9 but weaker support for H8. Existing party 
strength is only relevant in isolated cases and has no impact on participation 
in high intensity activity (H8). By way of contrast, the level of party competition 
in the district influences both the overall level of supporter activity and the 
propensity to engage in high intensity activity (H9). Supporters are more 
active in seats where the contest is close or where there is a good chance of 
victory. 
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Table 5. Existing Membership Strength, Previous Electoral Performance and Supporter 
Involvement in High Intensity Activity 
 
Dependent Variable = 
Supporter Involvement in High  
Intensity Activity 
 
Conservative 
(n=153) 
 
Labour 
(n=242) 
 
Lib Dems 
(n=140) 
 
   b S.E. Sig   b S.E. Sig  b S.E. Sig 
No. of Party Members 
 
0.35 (0.35) n.s. 0.10 (0.22)  n.s. 0.15 (0.25) n.s. 
% Covered by Active Local Org. 
 
-0.26 (0.23) n.s. 0.01 (0.17) n.s -0.10 (0.33) n.s. 
Ultra Marginal Seat 
 
1.25 (0.65) n.s. 1.32 (0.50) ** 2.43 (0.96) ** 
Marginal Seat 
 
1.59 (0.61) ** 0.97 (0.45) * 1.93 (0.83) * 
Safe Seat 
 
0.86 (0.53) n.s. 1.01 (0.38) ** 2.08 (0.88) * 
Constant 
 
-0.51 (0.35) n.s. -0.44 (0.20) * -2.26 (0.36) ** 
McFadden’s  R2  0.06   0.06   0.17  
Log Likelihood  -99.38   -158.00   -61.12  
 
Note 1: ** p<.01 * p<.05  n.s not statistically significant; 
 
 
Figure 2: Average Marginal Effects (with 95% confidence intervals) of Conservative 
supporters participating in high intensity activities 
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Figure 3: Average Marginal Effects (with 95% confidence intervals) of Labour supporters 
participating in high intensity activities 
 
 
Figure 4: Average Marginal Effects (with 95% confidence intervals) of Liberal Democrat 
supporters participating in high intensity activities 
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Conclusions 
Supporters are an increasingly integral aspect of parties’ activities in a range 
of democracies. Not only is participation widespread, the level of activity is 
clearly nontrivial. In election campaigns, we observe that while supporters 
tend to be more likely to engage in low intensity activity, their contribution 
remains important. And, there is growing evidence that supporters are 
becoming integrated into other aspects of party organisation.  
 
The implications of such developments are numerous. First, it challenges our 
traditional understanding of parties, whereby formal members constitute the 
principal source of voluntary labour and electorates for internal decision 
making. Second, it challenges models of party organisation, which have 
focussed on membership incentives through participation in a range of party 
processes (e.g. Duverger, 1954; Strom, 1990). Third, it challenges the party 
decline thesis, whereby formal membership decline is a key indicator, with a 
party evolution approach, recognising newer modes of ‘membership’ (Cross & 
Gauja, 2014a; Gauja, 2014, 2015b; Gauja & Jackson, 2016; Sandri & 
Seddone, 2015). Summing up the importance of supporters, Gauja (2015c: 
233) argues that party membership has traditionally been viewed as a ‘static 
concept’ when in fact, we should view it instead as an evolving one, reflecting 
how parties are able to accommodate differing expectations and norms of 
both the state and citizen’s changing preferences in terms of participation. It is 
clear that  members are not the only source of activism and as such, models 
of party organisation that focus on participation incentives based on the 
assumption that formal members singularly constitute the grassroots need to 
be re-cast. As Gauja (2015c: 232) notes, while ‘party decline is a prominent 
theme in the scholarly literature…citizens are looking to alternate means of 
political expression.’ Parties are evolving and adapting and the sometimes 
almost apocalyptic suggestions in the party decline literature need revisiting.   
 
But key questions emerge in respect of the recruitment of supporters. Is 
supporter recruitment a function of party structure, or is it better explained by 
responses to parties’ electoral fortunes? While much of the existing literature 
suggests that structural factors are likely to be paramount, our testing of 
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alternative explanations suggests that electoral fortunes may offer a more 
convincing explanation – supporters are more or less likely to be recruited 
depending upon the electoral popularity of the party. Just as other work on 
party organisation, which suggests that electoral performance can be a strong 
influence on member retention (Fisher, 2000; Fisher, Denver & Hands, 2006), 
so it is also true of supporters. By way of contrast, the structure thesis has far 
less support. And, these findings are borne out not only in terms of 
recruitment, but also in terms of levels of activity. Electoral circumstances 
have a strong impact on levels of supporter activity, even when controlling for 
parties’ existing strength. Supporters are active in seats where there the party 
is likely to win or where the contest in close.  
 
This paper therefore represents a direct challenge to the existing literature 
which places a strong emphasis on the importance of party structure. It also 
challenges other aspects of the extant literature in respect of the means by 
which supporters are recruited. It shows that the existing emphasis on online 
recruitment is over-stated, and when online is compared with other modes of 
recruitment, it is clear that – in Britain, at least - human contact remains the 
most potent recruiting sergeant. In sum, this paper suggests that party 
scholars need to look beyond structural explanations when seeking to explain 
activism. Rather, they need to pay more attention to ones rooted more in 
rational choice. Activists directly consider the appeal of their involvement as a 
function of its likely impact – they back winners. And the reverse is also true – 
activity is diminished if a party is unpopular. All of which presents potential 
problems for parties, since the important role of supporters in their electoral 
campaigns can be affected seriously by their level of electoral popularity.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Representativeness of Responses 
 
% Ultra-Marginal 
Maj. <5% 
Marginal 
Maj. 5-10% 
Safe Held 
Maj.>10% 
Safe Not Held 
Maj.>10% 
All Seats (631) 
    
Conservative 11 15 36 38 
Labour 11 13 28 48 
Lib Dems 5 6 5 84 
Responses 
    
Conservative (244) 7 13 43 37 
Labour (336) 10 12 23 55 
Lib Dems (332) 5 6 6 83 
 
 
Table A2. Existing Membership Strength, Previous Electoral Performance and Supporter 
Activity - OLS 
 
Dependent Variable = 
Level of Supporter Activity 
 
Conservative 
(n=153) 
 
Labour 
(n=242) 
 
Lib Dems 
(n=140) 
 
 b S.E. Sig b S.E. Sig b S.E. Sig 
Constant 
 
2.000 (.157) ** 2.232 (.101) ** 1.693 (.078) ** 
No. of Party Members 
 
0.289 (.183) n.s. 0.194 (.096) ** 0.258 (.111) ** 
% Covered by Active Local Org 
 
-0.039 (.115) n.s. 0.147 (.090) n.s. -0.027  (.124) n.s. 
Ultra Marginal Seat 1.621  (.363) ** 0.908 (.252) ** 1.057 (.409) ** 
          
Marginal Seat 
 
1.239 (.317) ** 0.756 (.238) ** 0.993 (.393) ** 
Safe Seat 0.791 (.250) ** 0.384 (.206) * 1.018 (.402) ** 
Adj. R2 .248  .183  .322 
 
Note 1: ** p<.01 * p<.05  n.s not statistically significant; 2. Number of Party Members and % Covered by Active Local 
Organisation are standardised.  
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